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1.  Introduction  
 
Recently, a lot of attention has been paid to improving techniques and data 
to better assess the effectiveness of development interventions.  This is a 
welcome move in so far as the impact of such interventions in the past has 
usually been poorly assessed.  It is particularly welcome with regard to 
community-based, or participatory aid projects since considerable resources are 
being currently earmarked for them by almost all types of donor agencies, 
including large international organizations.  For example, the amount lent by the 
World Bank for CDD (Community-Driven Development) projects has massively 
increased from $325 million in 1996 to a conservatively estimated figure of $2 
billion in 2003 (Mansuri and Rao, 2003).  Furthermore, CDD has been, for many 
decades, the key approach advocated by many Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) working in developing areas.  Yet, it is a sobering fact that, in spite of 
such a long experience with this approach, scant material is available from NGOs 
to allow us to gain useful insights into the validity and the conditions for success 
of the participatory approach. 
The scepticism of many NGOs about the need and purpose of evaluation 
and their emphasis of action over analysis are largely responsible for this 
situation (Ebrahim 2003: 817).  The evidence produced in favor of CDD thus 
tends to be anecdotal, based on unqualified generalizations or unsubstantiated 
claims.  In point of fact, when evaluations take place, they are often biased in a 
direction favorable to CDD projects.  Indeed, a “praise culture” is pervasive 
among all the actors involved who have a tendency to “resist the presence of 
evaluators and make efforts to influence their work and present results that will 
provide a more favorable impression” (Mansuri and Rao 2003 : 30-31; Riddel 
1999: 223-34).  Finally, to the extent that serious evaluations of NGO projects 
exist, they are almost never released for public scrutiny. As pointed out by 
Alnoor Ebrahim (2003: 825), “For a sector that views itself as largely mission-
driven, there is an urgent need to take performance assessment seriously in order 
to justify activities with substantiated evidence rather than with anecdote or 
rhetoric”. 
Unfortunately, the criticism can be extended to almost all organizations 
that have adopted the CDD approach.  Thus, for example, interventions funded 
by the World Bank have also been inadequately assessed, a fact deemed 
“inexcusable” by Mansuri and Rao (2003).  The consequence of this dearth of 
reliable evaluations is ineffective learning-by-doing where it is badly needed.  
Clearly, so far as we can judge from recent surveys (Conning and Kevane 2002 ; 
Bardhan 2002 ; Mansuri and Rao 2003), available evidence does not justify the 
speed and the enthusiasm with which many agencies, especially large 
bureaucracies, have started to implement CDD (Platteau and Abraham 2001, 
2002, 2003).  As a matter of fact, the evidence at hand does not unambiguously 
confirm the view that CDD projects are more effective than more conventional 
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approaches in terms of efficiency, equity (reaching the poor), and sustainability.  
NGOs themselves, contrary to a widespread belief, have not produced 
impressive results, even with respect to alleviation of poverty and promotion of 
participation (Carroll 1992; White and Eicher 1999: 33).  The same agnostic 
conclusion emerges from a recent review of empirical studies of decentralized 
delivery of public services.  For the author, indeed, although the studies 
available suggest generally positive effects of decentralization, “it is hard to 
draw conclusive lessons” and, therefore,  “the idea of decentralization may need 
some protection against its own enthusiasts” (Bardhan 2002: 200, 187; and 
Asthana 2003, for an example).  Caution is required because most studies are 
essentially descriptive and point to correlations rather than carefully tested 
causal relationships.    
This being said, both the limitations and the cost of new impact appraisal 
techniques, especially for comparatively small organizations that sometimes have 
a long experience, and perhaps a comparative advantage in, the CDD approach, 
may constitute a serious barrier to adopting them.  In addition, not all projects 
and programs are amenable to evaluation by these modern techniques, and the 
extent to which some objectives, such as sustainability, have been attained are not 
easily captured by them either.  Finally, a point that is rarely made by economists 
concerns the reliability of the data collected.  My own experience with NGO 
projects over the last thirty years has convinced me that quality of the data is 
probably the most tricky problem.  Consider the following judgment pronounced 
by an anthropologist with a long field experience in Mossi villages of Burkina 
Faso: 
 
“Confronted with the hegemonic ‘project’ of the donor, the local population, for fear of 
losing the aid offer, prefer to remain silent about their practices and aspirations.  This is 
because these practices and aspirations are perceived to be so far away from those of 
the donor that they are better not disclosed.  Such is the vicious circle of development 
cooperation: the fear of avowing the discrepancy between the two views because it 
could lead to the discontinuation of the aid relationship, has the effect of strengthening 
the donor’s confidence in the validity of its approach” (Laurent 1998: 212 -my 
translation).  
 
Reliability of information is still more questionable when we consider 
queries about the distribution of projects benefits that are not directly and easily 
observable.  Answers may be elusive or squarely wrong because asymmetrical 
social relations prevent people from speaking out the truth.  
The purpose of this paper is to argue that, when the so-called ‘elite capture’ 
problem is serious, mechanisms of fraud detection are necessary, yet they are not 
enough.  Coordination mechanisms, at the level of aid agencies and/or at the level 
of the ultimate purveyors of funds for CDD, must exist to tame or mitigate the 
opportunism of local leaders.  One important conclusion of our analysis is that no 
effective control of the elite capture problem is possible if failures encountered 
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by aid agencies are punished while successes are rewarded.  Taking this 
conclusion into account would involve a radical change of perspective in 
development aid circles.  As for impact assessment studies, they would clearly 
make an important contribution if they could be used towards the purpose of 
detecting fraud, which implies that the aforementioned problem of fact disclosure 
in distributional matters is somehow surmounted. 
In Section 2, the importance of the elite capture problem is illustrated from 
a case study material and further documented.  Based on a framework of strategic 
relationships between the various actors involved in CDD projects, Section 3 then 
proceeds by examining the feasibility of a leader-disciplining mechanism using 
sequential and conditional disbursement of aid funds in the context of 
decentralized bilateral relationships.  In the light of the inherent limitations of 
such a solution, more sophisticated, multilateral control mechanisms are 
discussed in Section 4.  The role of impact assessment studies and the 
dissemination of their main results will come out clearly at that stage.  Section 5 
concludes. 
 
 
2. Evidence of Elite Capture at Local Level 
 
A Case Study from West Africa 
 
In the late years of the 20th century, a Western European development 
NGO (whose identity is not disclosed for the sake of discretion) established a 
relationship with a village association in a Sahelian country (see Platteau and 
Gaspart 2003).  This association, which is a federation of several peasant unions, 
had been initiated by a young and dynamic school teacher, the son of a local 
chief.  The NGO decided to follow a gradual participatory approach consisting 
of strengthening the association institutionally before channeling financial 
resources to it.  This decision was the outcome of a carefully worked out 
diagnosis that brought to light important weaknesses of the partner association.  
Clearly, those weaknesses had to be corrected before genuine collaboration 
could take place: proclivity to view aid agencies as purveyors of money which 
can be tapped simultaneously, lack of analysis of local problems and of strategic 
vision for future action, loose and undemocratic character of the association (ill-
defined objectives, ill-defined roles and responsibilities of the office bearers, 
absence of internal rules and reporting procedures, etc.). 
After two years during which institutional support was provided in the 
form of guidance to improve the internal functioning of the partner association 
and to help define development priorities and the best means to achieve them, 
funds were made available for different types of investment.  Within the limits 
of the budget set for each prioritized line of investment, the association could 
choose the project deemed most useful.  A special committee was established to 
 5 
prepare rules regarding the use of the budget and enforce the abidance of such 
rules by different projects.  In this way, the group could hopefully appropriate 
the process of decision-making, preparation of project proposals and 
programming of the activities involved (all aspects traditionally undertaken by 
the foreign donor agencies).  Continued support at different levels (technical, 
administrative, organizational, and methodological) was found necessary to help 
in the effective implementation of the projects.   
In spite of all these efforts to strengthen the partner association 
institutionally, things turned out badly.  Thanks to the collaboration of two 
active members of the General Assembly (actually two animators) and the local 
accountant, the foreign NGO discovered serious financial and other malpractices 
that were committed by the main leader of the African association: falsifying of 
accounts and invoice over-reporting, under-performance by contractors using 
low-quality materials, etc.  It reacted by calling on the local committee to 
sanction these manifest violations of the rules, yet at its great surprise no 
punishment was meted out and the general assembly even re-elected their leader 
in open defiance of its request.  The two dissident animators were blamed for 
being driven by jealousy and envy, while the accountant was fired.  Here is a 
clear illustration of the support that poor people are inclined to give to an elite 
member on the ground that they have benefited from his leadership efforts.  That 
he appropriated to himself a disproportionate share of the benefits of the aid 
program is considered legitimate by most of them.  They indeed think that 
without his efforts their own situation would not have improved at all.  In 
particular, he created the village association which had to be formed in order to 
be eligible for external assistance.  
In a context where the ability to deal with external sources of funding is 
concentrated in a small elite group, the bargaining strength of common people is 
inevitably limited, hence their ready acceptance of highly asymmetric patterns 
of distribution of programs’ benefits.  If the intervention of the elite results in an 
improvement of the predicament of the poor, however small is the improvement, 
the latter tend to be thankful to their leader(s): the new outcome represents a 
Pareto improvement over the previous situation and this is what matters after all.  
In the above example, it is thus revealing that the ordinary members of the 
association defended their leader on the ground that “everybody around him 
benefited from the project and, if he benefited [much] more than the others, it is 
understandable because he is the leader”.  They think it is highly unfair on the 
part of the foreign NGO to have withdrawn their support to the existing team 
and to have “humiliated their leader” by depriving him of all the logistical 
means (jeep, scooters, etc) previously put at his disposal.   
As for the leader himself, he openly admitted (during a conciliatory 
meeting organized by the high commissioner of the province) to have used a 
significant portion of the money entrusted to him for his own personal benefit.  
Yet, he did not express any regret since it was his perceived right to appropriate 
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a large share of the funds.  Did he not devote considerable energies to the setting 
up of the local organization and the mobilization of the local resources as 
required by the foreign NGO?  By attempting to curb his power to allocate funds 
in the way he deemed fit, the latter exercised an intolerable measure of neo-
colonialist pressure.  This criticism was voiced in spite of the fact that the NGO 
paid him a comfortable salary to reward his organizing efforts. 
Stories like this one could be easily multiplied and the authors personally 
went through several similar experiences while working with local groups, 
NGOs and associations through Europe-based aid agencies.  What must be 
stressed is that the attitudes involved partake of the logic of clientelistic politics 
characteristic of the African continent.  In the words of Chabal and Daloz, 
indeed, “For those at the very bottom of the social order, the material prosperity 
of their betters is not itself reprehensible so long as they too can benefit 
materially from their association with a patron linking them to the elites” 
(Chabal and Daloz, 1999: 42).  As a result, abuses of power are tolerated so long 
as the patron is able to meet the demands made by his clients who are concerned 
above all with ensuring their daily livelihood.   
It is ultimately because they overlook the genuine nature of the links 
between elites and commoners, rulers and ruled in Africa that international 
donor agencies overestimate the capacity of the participatory approach to deliver 
development gains more effectively and equitably.   
 
Elite Capture and Development Brokers 
 
The problem of ‘elite capture’ is especially serious as donor agencies are 
enthusiastically rushing to adopt the participatory approach because they are 
eager to relieve poverty in the most disadvantaged countries and/or because they 
need rapid and visible results to persuade their constituencies or sponsors that the 
new strategy works well.  Clearly, such urgency runs against the requirements of 
an effective CDD since the latter cannot succeed unless it is based on a genuine 
empowerment of the rural poor (see, e.g., Rahman 1993; Edwards and Hulme 
1996).  If the required time is not spent to ensure that the poor acquire real 
bargaining strength and organizational skills, ‘ownership’ of the projects by the 
beneficiary groups is most likely to remain an elusive objective, such as has been 
observed in the case of the World Bank’s Social Investment Funds (Narayan and 
Ebbe 1997; Tendler 2000: 16-17). 
The perverse mechanism that risks undermining CDD is triggered by the 
temptation of donor agencies to skip the empowerment phase by asking intended 
beneficiaries to form groups or partner associations and to ‘elect’ leaders to direct 
them.  As pointed out by Esman and Uphoff (1984: 249):  
 
“The most prominent members are invariably selected and then given training and 
control over resources for the community, without any detailed and extended 
communication with the other members about objectives, rights, or duties.  Creating 
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the groups through these leaders, in effect, establishes a power relationship that is 
open to abuse.  The agency has little or no communication with the community 
except through these leaders.  The more training and resources they are given, the 
more distance is created between leaders and members.  The shortcut of trying to 
mobilize rural people from outside through leaders, rather than taking the time to gain 
direct understanding and support from members, is likely to be unproductive or even 
counterproductive, entrenching a privileged minority and discrediting the idea of 
group action for self-improvement” (Esman and Uphoff 1984 : 249).1  
 
Confirming the prediction of Esman and Uphoff, several studies have 
concluded that the formation and training of village groups in community-based 
projects have the effect of encouraging the entry of wealthier and more educated 
people into leadership positions because of the attractiveness of outside funding 
(Gugerty and Kremer 1999, 2000; Rao and Ibanez 2001).  In point of fact, a 
major problem confronted by the community development movement of the 
1950s (which had been attempted by the Ford Foundation and US foreign 
assistance programs) lay in its inability to effectively counter the vested interests 
of local elites (Holdcroft 1984: 51).  Being adept at representing their own 
interests as community concerns expressed in the light of project deliverables, 
local leaders often succeed in deluding the donors into thinking that their 
motivations are guided by the collective good (Mosse 2001; Harrison 2002; Ribot 
1996, 2002).  Their demands are replete with the sort of pleas and vocabulary that 
strongly appeal to the donors and, in order to create the appearance of 
participation, they may go as far as spending resources to build community 
centers, hold rallies, and initiate showcase labor-intensive activities (Conning and 
Kevane 2002: 383).   
Traditional elites are not the only category of persons to benefit from the 
newly channeled resources since they are frequently involved in tactical alliances 
with educated persons and politicians operating outside the village domain.  
Urban elites may actually be responsible for initiating the process that deflects 
CDD from its intended purpose.  Witness to it is the proliferation of national 
NGOs that are created at the initiative of educated unemployed individuals, 
politicians, or state employees who may have been laid off, or deprived of access 
to key logistical resources, as a result of structural adjustment measures.  Acting 
as ‘development brokers’, political entrepreneurs have been quick to understand 
that the creation of an NGO has become one of the best means of procuring funds 
from the international community (Bierschenk, de Sardan, and Chauveau 2000).  
In the words of Chabal and Daloz (1999): 
 
“…a large number of key political actors have now shifted their operations to the 
local level, which currently enjoys wide international favour and receives substantial 
                                                
1 In the light of this diagnosis, Cernea’s contention that “NGOs insert themselves not as a 
third and different/independent actor, but as an emanation and representation of the 
community” (Cernea 1988: 10), appears almost surrealist. 
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assistance…[] a massive proliferation of NGOs … is less the outcome of the 
increasing political weight of civil society than the consequence of the very pragmatic 
realization that resources are now largely channelled through NGOs…  Indeed, NGOs 
are often nothing other than the new ‘structures’ with which Africans can seek to 
establish an instrumentally profitable position within the existing system of neo-
patrimonialism…  Above and beyond the new discourse of NGO ideology…, the 
political economy of foreign aid has not changed significantly.  The use of NGO 
resources can today serve the strategic interests of the classical entrepreneurial Big 
Man just as well as access to state coffers did in the past… Furthermore, NGO-linked 
networks are inevitably intertwined with those emanating from the state” (Chabal and 
Daloz 1999 : 22-24, 105).      
   
Thus, in the case of Benin, a West African country especially spoiled by 
the donors, we learn that local NGOs and associations, which are often “empty 
shells established with the sole purpose of capturing aid”, have multiplied within 
a short period of time to number several thousands.  Many others wait to receive 
the approval of the ministry of interior (Le Monde, 26 February 2001).  In non-
African countries also, NGOs often constitute “an opportunistic response of 
downsized bureaucrats, with no real participation or local empowerment” and, 
inevitably, program officers themselves become involved in the creation of 
community institutions (Conning and Kevane 2002: 383-84; see also Meyer 
1995; Bebbington 1997; Gray 1999).  In India, for example, we are told that 
“NGOs promoted by the politicians and contractors do not hesitate to bribe the 
officials and have a tendency to keep information to themselves.  Therefore, they 
were far more successful in mobilizing the resources as compared to those NGOs 
with social commitment and values” (Rajasekhar and Biradar 2002: 18).  Such 
risk of aid capture by development brokers is obviously high when self-
conscious, organized local communities do not actually exist prior to the opening 
up of new development opportunities by state agencies or international donors 
(see Li 2001, for a well-documented illustration of this possibility), while the 
latter presume their existence on a priori grounds (McDermott 2001). 
Of course, not all local leaders are opportunists ready to divert foreign aid 
from the intended beneficiaries.  Several studies actually point to substantial 
variations in targeting effectiveness across villages (Ravallion 2000; Jalan and 
Ravallion forthcoming).  Interestingly, intra-village inequality is often found to 
be inversely related to this effectiveness (Galasso and Ravallion forthcoming), 
confirming the prediction derived from Bardhan and Mookherjee’s political 
economy model (see supra) and suggesting that the local elite tend to appropriate 
a larger share of the transfers in communities that are highly unequal to begin 
with.   
Future evidence will settle the issue of the extent to which cases of 
embezzling behavior outweigh cases of leaders who are either unable (owing to 
sufficient empowerment of the grassroots) or unwilling (because they somehow 
share the ethical code of aid agencies) to embezzle aid funds.  Results are likely 
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to vary from one region to another, depending on the strength of social 
movements, levels of rural literacy, etc.  Yet, we believe that anecdotal evidence 
about the misdeeds of local elite is plentiful enough, at least in poor countries 
such as those of  SubSaharan Africa, to justify a cautious attitude about the 
possible impact of the CDD approach.  While thinking about mechanisms aimed 
at keeping fraudulent behavior in check, we will therefore assume that leaders do 
not share the values of foreign aid agencies and that the grassroots are not 
empowered to dispute their decisions.   
 
 
3. Sequential and Conditional Disbursement Procedures in the Context 
of Decentralized Bilateral Relationships  
 
In order to analyze with the necessary rigour possible mechanisms for 
controlling elite capture as well as the influence of different factors on the extent 
of this phenomenon, I adopt a framework of inter-agency relationships that is 
directly inspired by the case study material presented in the first half of Section 2.  
Such a framework is, of course, a simplification of reality as it is based on 
stylized facts generalized from one particular sort of experiences.  It comprises 
assumptions regarding both the setting of inter-agency interactions as well as the 
behaviour of the various agencies involved.  Yet, I believe that the kind of story 
on which the following conceptualization is based is sufficiently credible to 
justify building the analysis upon it.  In addition, the plausibility of the main 
results obtained will actually confirm the validity of the underlying theoretical 
model as a useful guide to understand some key determinants of the effectiveness 
of CDD for reaching poor people.  
We have four sets of actors, namely the ultimate purveyors of funds 
(denoted by P), such as the taxpayers or the general public in fund-raising 
campaigns, aid agencies (designated by A), local leaders or intermediaries 
(designated by L), and the grassroots (designated by G) who are the intended 
beneficiaries of the aid transfers.   To begin with, let us focus our attention on the 
last two steps in the sequence of aid disbursement, such as are represented by 
links (2) and (3) in  Figure 1.  In other words, we abstract away from the upper 
link between an aid agency and its ultimate fund purveyor.  Following the logic 
of the CDD approach, A contemplates providing funds to a particular community 
or group of grassroots people, G, who do not have any alternative funding 
possibility.  A therefore aims at reaching the grassroots as effectively as possible 
because it is its social purpose to do so.  There is no direct contact between A and 
G, however, since A deals with a local leader or intermediary acting on behalf of 
the intended beneficiaries.  Typically, L has organized G into a development 
association and has been ‘elected’ president.   
What A can do, however, is to check whether L is genuinely supported by 
G, say because G can be asked to confirm that L is their authentic leader, whether 
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through a formal voting procedure or otherwise.  As a matter of principle, A will 
not disburse funds through L unless it has received such confirmation.  How the 
money is being shared within the group or community of grassroots is not 
observed by A, but A acts strategically taking the behavior of L into account 
while making its decision to support or not to support a given community.  It is 
assumed that L wants to appropriate as much aid as possible subject to G’s 
approval and respect of local norms (see infra). 
 
Figure 1 : The Sequence of Aid Disbursement 
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Local 
Leader 
(L) 
 
Grassroots 
(G) 
(1) 
 
(2) 
(3) 
 
 
 11 
The strategic interactions between L and G can be essentially depicted as 
an ultimatum game.  That is, L has the first move and makes an offer to G 
regarding the apportionment of the aid fund.  Then, G has to say whether they 
accept the offer or not, knowing that its rejection would mean the collapse of the 
group consensus required to receive aid from A.  In such a game, as is well-
known, it is in the interest of the second mover (G) to accept the proposal made 
by the first mover (L), and the latter’s (L’s) interest is therefore to set the share 
accruing to the former (G) at as low level as possible.  This is so because G do 
not wield sufficient leverage to dispute the self-asserted right of L to appropriate 
a large share of the aid proceeds.  In fact, as illustrated in the above story, G may 
not resent L’s disproportionate share in so far as their own situation has 
simultaneously improved. 
Here is obviously a depressing result in view of the CDD’s objectives.  
One would therefore like to conceive of some mechanism that could discipline 
local leaders in the absence of democratic governance within target groups or 
communities.  The mechanism that comes immediately to the mind of economists 
is a stepwise process of aid transfer.  Instead of releasing money in a single shot, 
aid funds would be disbursed in successive tranches, the disbursement of each of 
them being conditioned on L’s proper behavior regarding the use of previous 
tranches.  Inherent in such a strategy is the recourse to a fraud detection 
technology without which local leaders would not be incited to behave.  
Detection is necessarily costly, yet it is in the interest of an aid agency to incur 
the related expenses since it can thereby hope to better achieve its own objective 
of poverty relief (fraud detection is incentive-compatible). 
As we know from repeated game theory, however, as long as the duration 
of the game is finite, and no matter how high is the number of periods in the 
game, the equilibrium outcome will be the same as that obtaining in the one-
period game (Kreps and Wilson 1982 ; Kreps 1990: 536-43).  The effort, 
including the monitoring resources, spent by the aid agency over the successive 
stages of the project will be of no avail.  Assuming that the local leaders are 
selfishly rational, they will embezzle funds from the very beginning and, 
knowing that, aid agencies should refrain from disbursing even the first tranche 
of money.  True, if the aid agency interacts with communities over an infinite (or 
indeterminate) period of time, this awkward result can be avoided.  But this is 
hardly a consoling thought inasmuch as CDD aid, in particular, is precisely aimed 
at making communities self-supporting after a certain period of time and the 
limited duration of the external intervention is better made clear from the 
beginning.   
That being said, the assumption of strategic rationality underlying the 
above reasoning is questionable.  This is not only because actors may not 
perfectly anticipate the future consequences of their actions and the reactions of 
others, or because they may entertain doubts about the rationality of the persons 
with whom they interact (in which case we know that even in a finitely repeated 
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game, cooperation may be established as an equilibrium), but also because some 
social norms may exist that have the effect of constraining rational calculations.   
The existence of a norm of intertemporal fairness among G may thus make 
gradual, conditional disbursing of aid money effective even in the context of a 
finitely repeated interactions between A and L.  The reason becomes evident if 
such a norm dictates that a division rule adopted during one period may not be 
changed at will by L during a later period, especially if the change is made at the 
expense of G.  In other words, L is not allowed to reduce the share of aid 
transfers accruing to G over the successive stages of a project.  In a two-period 
‘CDD game’, he or she will thus be unable to strategically lower the share 
allotted to G between the first and the second rounds.  As a result, since the 
granting of the second tranche is conditional upon L’s proper behavior in the 
previous round and since the probability of fraud detection can be assumed to 
increase with the extent of the embezzlement, the portion granted by L to G will 
be the minimum share compatible with an acceptably low risk of detection at the 
end of the first round, and this share will be applied again during the second 
round.  Clearly, the norm of intertemporal fairness serves the purpose of 
conferring a genuine bargaining power upon G during the second round.   
This is not sufficient, however.  For the mechanism to be effective, G must 
also be able to perfectly enforce L’s promise to pay them the agreed share of the 
aid transfer once A has released the money.  The  story told in the previous 
section seems to attest that enforcement is not the real problem: even though their 
leader embezzled substantial amounts of aid money, villagers did not feel cheated 
and actually voted for the predatory leader again even after his malpractices had 
been fully revealed and confessed.  It therefore appears that G must be 
empowered enough to enforce L’s promise but not enough to actively debate the 
sharing rule with him (her).  If G were not empowered enough even in the first 
sense, they would be doomed to be seriously exploited by L and there is not much 
that could be done to relieve their poverty until, through time-consuming 
conscientization and learning processes, they become better able to defend their 
rights and effectively participate in decision-making.  On the other hand, if they 
were empowered enough in both senses, the sharing rule would be determined as 
the outcome of a bargaining process between L and G, and not by L only2. 
In the two-period game-theoretical model proposed by Platteau and 
Gaspart (2003b), A, which is altruistic, decides the way to allocate the available 
aid budget beween two successive periods, as well as the amount of monitoring 
expenses on which the effectiveness of fraud detection partly depends.  Given the 
amounts of the first and second aid tranches as well as the size of the monitoring 
                                                
2 Provided that the bargaining strength of G is strong enough, disciplining L with the help of a 
stage-process of aid disbursing will not have the effect of raising the share of aid money 
accruing to the intended beneficiaries.  To achieve its objective, the aid agency could 
therefore rely on the bargaining strength of the latter.  To be sure, some embezzlement would 
still occur, but the agency would not be able to do better by using such a stage-mechanism . 
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effort made by A, L chooses the share of the aid transfers that he or she will hand 
over to G, among whom a norm of intertemporal fairness is known to prevail.  
While making its decisions, A faces the following trade-off.  On the one hand, A 
would like to disburse as much money as possible during the first period because 
it is impatient to see the poverty of G alleviated.  On the other hand, A wants to 
defer its disbursement of aid till the second period, since late payments serve to 
discipline L.  Indeed, the higher the amount of the second tranche relative to that 
of the first, the more L is encouraged to use the aid transfers according to A’s 
prescriptions (that is, for the benefit of G).3   
One important result derived from the comparative-static of the model is 
the following: the more impatient the aid agency –that is, the more A discounts 
the benefits enjoyed by the target population during the second period–, the 
smaller the amount of the second aid tranche relative to that of the first tranche, 
and the lower the share accruing to G.  (At the limit, if A is very impatient, the 
share accruing to G will tend to a value as low as that obtained under a one-shot 
disbursement procedure.)  In other words, because the subjective cost of waiting 
is higher, A is less ready to use the leader-disciplining mechanism and to 
postpone disbursement of aid funds. As a consequence, L is less effectively 
induced to behave during the initial period, holding monitoring expenditures 
constant.  At the new equilibrium, however,  the amount of these expenditures is 
being increased.  The net effect of these two opposite forces is nevertheless 
shown to be detrimental to G: the share appropriated by L increases and the 
absolute amount of aid money that will accrue to G if there is no detection of 
fraud by A is smaller.  Bear in mind that monitoring expenses, which have been 
increased to substitute for the smaller use of the conditional mechanism of aid 
disbursement, are to be subtracted from the gross aid budget before transfers to 
G are made.   
A second interesting comparative-static result is that the higher the cost of 
recycling aid funds –or the smaller the proportion of aid money earmarked for the 
second tranche that can be costlessly redirected to another group or association in 
the event of detected fraud in the initial project–, the lower the relative amount of 
the second aid tranche, the smaller the share accruing to G, and the lower the 
amount of aid money accruing to them in the absence of fraud detection.  In other 
words, if it is more difficult to reallocate funds intended for a particular project, 
say, because of larger set-up costs, a donor agency will find deferment of their 
disbursement to be less attractive in equilibrium.  As a result, L will be in a better 
position to appropriate the aid money.  Aid agencies may therefore be tempted to 
avoid working in low density and remote areas where high set-up costs arising 
from long distances to be travelled, low education levels, etc, tend to reduce the 
effectiveness of their efforts to reach the poor. 
                                                
3 Note that the amount granted under the first tranche must be positive so as to ensure that L’s 
behaviour can be effectively tested before making a decision about whether or not to disburse 
the second tranche. 
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To sum up, (1°) if A adopts a sequential, conditional disbursement 
procedure, and (2)° if G wield enough power to compel L  both to stick to his 
(her) promises and to maintain over time the sharing rule followed in the initial 
round, then A is able to discipline L so as to make him (her) share aid money 
more or less equitably with the intended beneficiaries.  This said, it must be 
emphasized that the above model implicitly assumes that A enjoys local 
monopoly power in the supply of aid funds.  In point of fact, the problem gets 
complicated once aid agencies compete among themselves for access to target 
groups or communities.  If perfect competition prevails in a context 
characterized by an abundant supply of aid funds, G will only get crumbs.  This 
is the worst scenario: in their attempt to lure local leaders ‘representing’ 
communities, aid agencies are ready to drop their safeguards against the appetite 
of these leaders.  Money is disbursed quickly without paying much attention to 
the manner in which it is shared between L and G.   
A less pessimistic scenario arises if we consider, perhaps more 
realistically, that aid agencies do not produce a homogeneous service but 
differentiated, multi-attribute services comprising the total aid budget on offer, 
the timing of its disbursement over the successive tranches, and the monitoring 
effort.  Monopolistic competition would then prevail amongst donor agencies 
and Platteau and Gaspart’s analytical framework could be adjusted accordingly.  
This would imply that an exit option now exists for L, and that two critical 
parameters of the model, namely A’s intertemporal preference, and the cost of 
recycling aid funds, can be re-interpreted as possibly reflecting the intensity of 
prevailing competition among donor agencies.  Regarding these latter two 
factors, the comparative static of the model indicates that acute competition is an 
unambiguously regrettable feature of the aid environment.  As a matter of fact, 
by driving aid agencies to disburse funds quickly in order to prevent rival 
agencies  from de-stabilizing a particular aid supply relationship, and by 
increasing the cost of recycling funds in the event of fraud detection, acute 
competition causes the share of aid funds appropriated by local intermediaries to 
increase at the expense of the intended beneficiaries.  In other words, 
intermediaries can skilfully play on inter-agency competition since they know 
both that aid agencies are keen to find partners through whom to channel their 
aid budget and that this budget is more or less tied to the initially chosen project 
or community.   
It is also evident that the emergence of exit options following the 
proliferation of aid agencies has the effect of raising the share that local leaders 
are allowed to appropriate at equilibrium, that is, the share that will deter them 
from pursuing a shifting strategy.  A shifting strategy is a strategy whereby L 
does not care about staying with the same agency over the whole course of the 
aid project because he or she is ready, if caught cheating, to shift to another 
agency and start cheating again.  What is at work here is a so-called bilateral 
reputation mechanism (BRM): if caught embezzling funds, a local leader is 
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punished only by the aid agency that has actually provided the funds embezzled.  
Note, however, that if exit options are too attractive, it will be impossible to 
discourage L from shifting partners continuously after stealing the whole amount 
of the first tranches of aid money.  As a result, no agency will release money for 
CDD.  
There are apparently two ways whereby the ‘elite capture’ problem can be 
mitigated.  Reducing competition through concentration of aid supply in the 
hands of fewer agencies is the first way.  Indeed, by diminishing the exit options 
available to local intermediaries, especially if aid agencies are geographically 
specialized, such concentration in the market for aid would have the same effect 
as a reduction in the aggregate supply of aid.  The presence of scale economies 
in the technology of fraud detection when projects are geographically 
concentrated would constitute an additional advantage of this first solution.  The 
second solution consists of a coordination mechanism whereby aid agencies 
would mutually inform each other about fraudulent acts committed by 
intermediaries.  If such a device, known as a multilateral reputation mechanism 
(MRM), is apparently more feasible than reducing competition, it is not devoid 
of serious practical difficulties as will become evident from the discussion 
below. 
 
 
4. Multilateral Reputation Mechanisms 
 
Circulation of fraud-related information  among aid agencies 
 
The MRM has been documented by Greif (1989, 1994) with respect to 
relationships between traders (see also Platteau 2000: Chap. 6; Aoki 2001: 
Chap. 4).  Applied to our problem, the mechanism would work as follows.  
Operating within a repeated-game framework, an aid agency would adopt the 
strategy whereby its grants money to a local leader, but only provided that he 
(she) is not known to have cheated another agency some time in the past.  If 
money is thus disbursed and the benefiting leader is later found to have cheated 
the agency, the latter dutifully reports the fraud and communicates the name of 
the malevolent leader to the other members of the donor community.  Before 
embezzling funds, a leader would thus be incited to think twice because by 
cheating today he or she would spoil his (her) reputation for future interactions 
with the whole donor community.  The multilateral reputation strategy can be 
shown to be an equilibrium strategy.  That is, if a leader expects every donor 
agency to adopt such a strategy, his (her) interest is to share the aid fund 
equitably among the intended project beneficiaries.  Knowing that reaction, the 
interest of all aid agencies is to cling to the multilateral reputation strategy.  
Honest behaviour therefore gets established as a (Nash) equilibrium.  
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There are several problems with the MRM, however.  The first one stems 
from the fact that the information conditions that must be fulfilled for it to work 
are extremely stringent: information must circulate perfectly between donor 
agencies.  This is unlikely to be the case in reality, because they are in large 
numbers, scattered around the developed world, and very heterogeneous in terms 
of several key characteristics (size, ideology, methods, time horizon, etc.).  These 
are hardly ideal conditions for a dense information network to exist.   
Is the establishment of a private third party charged with centralizing 
information (as suggested, for example, in the Law Merchant system analyzed by 
Milgrom, North, and Weingast (1990) the solution to the problem caused by the 
costliness of generating and communicating information?  Such a system can 
effectively work only if donors have an incentive to detect fraud and report 
fraudulent experiences to the third party, so that the black list of dubious 
intermediaries in its hand is exhaustive and regularly updated (otherwise, donors 
would not be induced to consult it).  Yet, in so far as the detection and reporting 
of a fraud once it has occurred entails costs but brings no benefits to the 
individual agency which has been cheated, such an incentive does not exist.  
Unless, of course, aid agencies are so genuinely committed to the cause of 
poverty relief that they are not concerned about whether poverty is reduced by 
themselves or by another aid agency. 
To create the adequate incentive, the third party should be able to exercise 
pressure on the detected fraudulent leader so as to make him (her) return the 
stolen money.  A provision that unless an aid agency makes appropriate queries 
with the third party about the reliability of its current partner, it will not be 
entitled to use the system to obtain compensation would also make it in the 
interest of donors to query about past dealings of the partner-leader considered 
before disbursing money.  As a result, so the theory goes, the threat against 
potential leaders would be effective and, if caught, a fraudulent leader would be 
prompted to comply with the third party by returning the money stolen (so that 
his name is removed from the black list).  This said, Milgrom, North and 
Weingast have nevertheless shown that honesty will be established as a 
(symmetric sequential) equilibrium under the above mechanism only if a number 
of conditions are met, in particular, the cost of information query, the cost of 
appeal to the third party, and the cost for the latter to recover the stolen money 
from fraudulent local leaders ought not to be too high.  Unfortunately, these 
assumptions are likely to be violated in the case under concern, especially 
because the headquarters of aid agencies are located at great distances from one 
another, and all kinds of information are costly to acquire, including evidence of 
fraud in the opaque context of alien cultural environments.  The mechanism is 
therefore not self-enforcing. 
A second, equally important problem lies in the fact that local leaders may 
not be actually concerned with preserving their reputation because their time 
horizon is short and they could be quite happy with running away with the money 
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stolen from one single project.  In other words, the payoff from dishonest 
behaviour is so large compared to the payoff from honest behaviour that honesty 
cannot be induced at equilibrium.   
 
Rating of aid agencies by ultimate fund purveyors 
 
Up until now, one key actor has been missing from our discussion, namely 
the ultimate purveyors of funds from whom aid agencies obtain their financial 
resources.  These ultimate fund-providers create a further link in the game (see 
link (1) in Figure 1), giving rise to a new space of strategic relationships.  As far 
as disciplining of local leaders is concerned, their contribution may be positive or 
negative depending on the way they interact with aid agencies.   
The latter possibility arises if aid agencies expect them to react adversely 
to news of embezzlement, for instance, through revocation of funds.  In such 
circumstances, an aid organization has no incentive to report the acts of 
malfeasance detected in its projects.  In the words of Alnoor Ebrahim (2003: 
818), evaluations that reward successes while punishing failures “encourage 
NGOs to exaggerate successes, while discouraging them from revealing and 
closely scrutinizing their mistakes”.  What we have here is a genuine Prisoner’s 
Dilemma: an aid agency refrains from disclosing cases of embezzlement because 
it entertains the hope that other agencies would candidly reveal their own bad 
experiences, or because it fears that, should it convey the information, others 
might not have done it and would then exploit the situation to their own 
advantage.  That the above risk is real is evident from the atmosphere of secrecy 
that surrounds the activities of many donor organizations, including NGOs.  This 
atmosphere of secrecy is obviously detrimental to the effective functioning of a 
multilateral reputation mechanism such as discussed above. 
On the contrary, ultimate fund-purveyors can play a positive role if their 
understanding of the complexity of CDD processes is sophisticated enough to 
make them aware of the inevitability of failures.  Honest aid agencies which 
openly admit of cases of cheating would then not be unfairly sanctioned to the 
benefit of more opportunistic ones.  They could even be induced to reveal 
embezzlement cases if the disbursement and monitoring procedures used by aid 
agencies, as well as the duration of their CDD projects, were used by fund-
providers as a yardstick upon which ratings of these agencies are based.  In this 
perspective, self-reported cases of fraud detection could be considered as indirect 
evidence of the effectiveness of monitoring activities rather than as signs of 
failure.  Not only are such characteristics rather easy to observe, but they also 
offer the advantage of not creating perverse incentives for the rated agencies. 
The same cannot be said of other, more conventional criteria used to 
evaluate the work of aid agencies.  Resorting to measures of outputs, such as 
improvements in the levels of living of the poor inside the communities chosen, 
is an ideal procedure but is likely be too costly to be feasible, especially in the 
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case of NGOs with their typically diverse and long-term objectives (see Edwards 
and Hulme 1996; Ebrahim 2003).  Moreover, such measures could introduce 
biases in the selection of communities by the rated agencies.  As a matter of fact, 
the latter would be induced to choose communities in which poverty can be more 
easily reduced for other reasons than the prevailing power structure (e.g., easy 
accessibility). 
The need for a proper evaluation of aid agencies is all the more pressing 
as, side by side with serious agencies, there exist careless organizations that do 
not implement sequential disbursement mechanisms with a view to disciplining 
local leaders.  Such organizations tend to disburse funds quickly either because 
they do not have a proper understanding of the one-period game being thus 
played4, or because they are not single-mindedly pursuing the objective of 
poverty alleviation.  (For example, in spite of all their pro-poor rhetoric, they are 
also concerned with reproducing themselves as job- and income-providing 
organizations in the West).  Their presence further complicates the problem of 
‘elite capture’ not only because it has the effect of increasing the exit options 
available to local intermediaries but also because it makes the establishment of a 
MRM among all donor agencies impossible.  In fact, in the same way that “bad 
money chases good money”, the operation of these opportunistic aid agencies 
risks driving ‘good’ agencies out of business or, else, it will force them to relax 
or altogether give up their gradual and conditional disbursement procedures.  
Indeed, if offered the choice, local leaders will normally prefer to work with 
‘bad’ agencies.  And if the latter are numerous enough, ‘good’ agencies will not 
be able to attract partner communities unless they soften their approach to aid 
disbursement.   
A crucial difficulty remains.  As a matter of fact, it is easier for central 
funding bureaucracies (such as the European Community or the Cooperation 
administrations of national governments) than for the scattered contributors to 
fund-raising campaigns organized by NGOs, to use the sort of evaluations 
envisaged above and to condition their financial support on the results of these 
evaluations.  The crux of the problem lies in the fact that many donors in the 
general public have a poor understanding of development issues, partly as a result 
of distortions carried through the media and the deceiving messages conveyed by 
aid agencies themselves.  There generally prevails the simplistic idea that failures 
in development projects are necessarily the outcome of incompetence and 
mismanagement on the part of the aid agency concerned, all the more so if many 
other agencies claim repeated successes.   
Development aid is seen by many as a simple transfer of equipment and 
know how to those in need.  The important role of institutional arrangements, 
power relations, and organizational learning tends to be underestimated.  
                                                
4 Imperfect knowledge of the game typically arises when aid agencies tend to underestimate 
the leverage of the local leader within the group, or to overestimate his or her degree of 
altruism as a result of the leader’s cunning ability to deceive them or of their own naivety. 
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Therefore, failing projects are seen as an anomaly.  Such a lack of proper 
understanding of the complexity of community-based development processes is 
actually worrying in so far as leakages about even a few cases of failure may 
cause public opinion to easily swing from an attitude of general optimism to one 
of general pessimism and distrust in aid agencies.  If that happens, all aid 
agencies will lose.  To get out of this dangerous situation created by the 
versatility of public opinion, there is no other way than to educate the public 
about the real challenges and difficulties involved in CDD.  Development 
education is clearly a public good.  Aid agencies that free ride on this effort by 
claiming easy successes may, in the end, do it at their own peril. 
 
Alternative accountability mechanisms 
 
It could be argued that, of late, there has been a tendency among some aid 
agencies to organize collectively with a view to ensuring better conduct in the 
profession (Edwards and Hulme 1996).  In the United States, for example, a set 
of standards was developed in 1993 by Inter-Action, a membership association of 
US private voluntary organizations. “These standards lay out, in some detail, 
requirements concerning governance, organizational integrity, finances, public 
communication and disclosure, management and hiring practices, programs, and 
public policy involvement… Implementation of these standards is based on self-
certification, subject to review by a Standards Committee which is also 
empowered to investigate complaints about noncompliance” (Ebrahim 2003 : 
820).  In Bangladesh and India, likewise, associations of development agencies 
have come to life which have adopted their own code of ethics.  Other 
mechanisms of accountability are also being tried, such as social auditing, which 
involves “a shift from highly circumscribed evaluations of individual projects or 
programs to a broader assessment of the organization as a whole” (ibidem : 823; 
see also Zadek and Gatward 1996).  External verification of social audits seems 
essential if they are to be an effective means of tempering exaggerated claims by 
non-profit organizations about their own achievements. 
Problems with such endeavours ought not to be underestimated, however.  
As a matter of fact, codes of conduct are typically statements about general 
principles that are not easily translated into operational guidelines and 
enforceable standards.  It is hard to deny that lack of satisfactory evaluative 
mechanisms is a serious drawback when it comes to NGO accountability, and 
that indicators of the quality of their work are very rare, especially if their main 
aim is the empowerment of the poor (Edwards and Hulme 1996: 11).  This 
situation often arises because it is easier to agree on general ideas than to 
converge on strict and externally verifiable rules.  And if a satisfactory agreement 
is eventually reached, it is most likely adopted by only a restricted number of 
operating agencies.  Devising and enforcing NGO codes at an international level 
appear to be fraught with particularly awkward problems of coordination.  Note 
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also that, as pointed out above in connection with the MRM, uncertainty 
regarding the impact of social audits on the ultimate purveyors of aid funds is 
bound to make many NGOs reluctant to adopt them even though they may agree 
on their necessity in principle.  
 
Fraud detection and impact assessment studies 
 
It is evident from the whole analysis proposed in this paper that 
mechanisms of fraud detection have a key role to play in the disciplining of local 
leaders acting on behalf of target communities.  Whether in the framework of 
bilateral reputation mechanisms based on sequential and conditional 
disbursement of aid money, or in the framework of multilateral reputation 
mechanisms based on good dissemination of information among aid agencies, 
local leaders cannot be induced to behave if the probability of their being caught 
and thereafter punished is too low owing to ineffective fraud detection.  Platteau 
and Gaspart (2003b) have shown rigorously that the share of funds reaching the 
grassroots decreases with the ability of an aid agency to detect fraud.  Moreover, 
a low intrinsic ability to detect fraud (because the fraud-detection technology 
used is rather inefficient) can be compensated only partly by the positive effect of 
an increase in monitoring expenditures.  Bear in mind that the larger such 
expenditures the smaller the net amount of aid funds available for the project’s 
objectives proper.  It is therefore essential to devise and put into use satisfactory 
procedures aimed at assessing the extent to which the grassroots have benefited 
from CDD projects. 
For well-focused interventions the outputs of which are easily observable 
(think, for example, of projects intended for distributing school manuals to rural 
pupils), such assessment does not raise many problems and a careful impact 
study can show whether the aid transfer has reached the intended beneficiaries.  
Yet, in the case of more complex interventions, it may be more difficult to arrive 
at a sound judgment about the real destination of aid resources.  There are 
actually many subtle ways in which astute local leaders can divert funds destined 
for a collective project and to unmask these ways may prove quite tricky.  
Usually, the truth cannot emerge unless villagers are willing to speak out to 
agency’s mission staff or to external evaluators.  It is here that the main source of 
the problem lies.  In point of fact, it is often in the villagers’ best interest to 
remain silent about malpractices committed by the rural elite because, being in a 
dependent position, they have more to lose than to gain from revealing fraud.      
Indeed, whereas they are involved in continuous long-term relationships 
(they play infinitely repeated games in various walks of their ordinary life) with 
their local patrons, the duration of an external intervention is necessarily of 
limited duration.  In other words, the long-term cost of antagonizing a patron 
who can punish a non-compliant client in diverse ways is likely to exceed by a 
wide margin the short-term benefit of revealing facts about the sharing of aid 
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proceeds.  It is a rule that external donors are considered by local beneficiaries 
as ephemeral actors who carry much less weight than powerful local figures. 
Note that, if aid transfers to communities could be anchored in a 
framework of fiscal decentralization, such as is envisaged in many programs of 
decentralized development, there would be an endless round of disbursement 
periods and the situation would be akin to that of an infinitely repeated game.  
The outcome of the sort of cost-benefit calculus discussed above could then be 
reversed, but only if local patrons are not too active in other sectors of 
community life than the one affected by the money transfers. 
As the case study material presented in the first part of Section 2 attests, 
factional competition within rural communities may incite some people to reveal 
facts of malfeasance if they have been committed by rival leadership figures or 
patrons.  Confronted with the threat of such revelations, local leaders could thus 
be hopefully disciplined in their handling of CDD funds.  This said, one must 
also reckon with the negative externalities of a mechanism that fosters intra-elite 
competition rather than cooperation when collective endeavours are necessary 
for local development.  There is clearly a dilemma here: not-too-good relations 
between local leaders are necessary for effective fraud detection yet they are a 
liability threatening collective action at village or community level.  
  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
There are three main conclusions emerging from the above analysis.  First, 
‘elite capture’ is a serious problem for the CDD approach, at least in all the areas 
where the poor are not empowered enough to withstand the pressures and 
influence of the local elite.  It must therefore be addressed explicitly lest this 
approach should yield disappointing results in the sense of proving unable to 
increase the effectiveness of aid absorption and to better reach the poor than past 
approaches to development.   
Second, sequential and conditional release of aid funds is a useful 
approach to participatory development since it can help discipline local leaders 
or intermediaries.  It obviously implies that fraud can be possibly detected ex 
post, which requires aid agencies to devote substantial resources to project 
monitoring, thereby substituting external control for missing internal democratic 
governance.  If things go well, one might entertain the hope that in the process 
the poor will gradually learn to better defend their rights, monitor the actions of 
their leaders, compel them to enforce their promises and, hopefully, spawn new, 
alternative leadership figures able to compete with the existing elite. 
In so far as it is unrealistic to assume that all aid agencies will rigorously 
apply a leader-disciplining mechanism, if only because some of them are 
opportunistic or ill-informed and inexperienced about field realities, 
coordination mechanisms are required at the level of either aid agencies or 
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ultimate purveyors of funds.  And since coordination mechanisms, such as 
multilateral reputation mechanisms, are difficult to establish and implement 
effectively amongst aid agencies, due mainly to their large number and great 
heterogeneity, disciplining local leaders in the framework of CDD projects will 
require action on the part of the ultimate purveyors of funds.  To send the right 
signal to aid operators, fund providers should carefully avoid to systematically 
reward successes and punish failures.  As a matter of fact, detection of aid 
embezzlement may reveal a high degree of competence and rigor on the part of 
the aid agency involved.  Since the general public provides substantial aid 
resources through various fund-raising campaigns organized by NGOs, it is also 
important that the population in donor countries be conscientized about the 
inevitable difficulties of external aid interventions in general, and the pitfalls of 
CDD projects in particular. 
Third, and this directly follows from the above two conclusions, the 
problem as to how best to detect fraud in CDD projects is a critical dimension of 
the CDD approach and, unfortunately, one which has received only scant 
attention so far.  The potential role of impact assessment studies in this regard 
ought to be thought over.  More precisely, given the difficulty of getting people 
speak about the misdeeds of local elites, it is important to devise questions and 
measurements that are susceptible of revealing fraudulent acts in a roundabout 
manner.  The natural way of doing this is by measuring what the poor got from a 
CDD project and then check out whether this more or less matches expectations 
derived from the project’s design.  In the case of simple interventions focused on 
easily observable outcomes, this should not be too difficult.  In more complex 
cases, however, even to assess the benefits that the poor derived from a specific 
project may be an arduous task, if only because facts may be distorted in order 
to keep wrongdoings of the local elite away from sight.  The issue is obviously a 
difficult one, all the more so if detection of fraud is to occur in the course of a 
project’s cycle before the next tranche of money is being disbursed.  For all 
these reasons, it is essential that best practices are well disseminated among the 
agencies concerned. 
One thing is certain: evaluations need to go much beyond “bureaucratic” 
reports presenting financial accounts and “physical” achievements of CDD 
projects, such as they are required by many funding organizations (such as the 
European Commission and bilateral aid agencies).  As a matter of fact, this kind 
of reporting tends precisely to encourage and allow distorted presentations of 
achievements that emphasize successes and minimize failures. 
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